ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND THE IMPERATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

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ABSTRACT

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In July 1996 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
published Joint Vision 2010.   Joint Vision 2010 is the
"operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed
Forces for a challenging and uncertain future."   To achieve
the next level of joint operations, dubbed "Coherent Joint
Operations," the Services must adjust their individual
cultures. This paper analyzes four major areas. First, it
examines the nature of organizational culture. Second, it
identifies the notion of culture as it applies to the Armed
Forces. Third, it identifies the cultural imperatives of
Joint Vision 2010 and applies some tools from Edgar Schein's
models for influencing organizational culture changes.
Lastly, it provides recommendations for developing a joint
culture in the United States Armed Forces of the future.

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INTRODUCTION

October 1, 1996, marked the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Goldwater-Nichols

Act (GNA). GNA was a watershed act charging the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS), and the Service Chiefs, to become more "joint" in nature and operations. General John

M. Shalikashvili, the serving CJCS, noted this act made the chairman the focal point for

"jointness." The GNA also charged the CJCS with finding common solutions to problems

shared by all Services and unified commands.[1] General Shalikashvili further stated,

> Over the past ten years, numerous planning documents, a new national military strategy, and
> more robust programmatic assessments and recommendations were pioneered. Our
> interoperability of forces improved, and over sixty authoritative publications distributed to
> guide joint operations.[2]

The United States Armed Forces are more capable of conducting joint operations today

than at any time in their history. The GNA provided the initial framework and momentum to

improve the old system. Yet, despite recent successes, current senior leaders throughout the

military acknowledge the joint arena requires more work. General Shalikashvili recognizes the

great strides each service made in joint operations, but quickly adds, "We have some distance to

go."[3]

The continued need for improved joint cooperation did not go unnoticed by the

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. In the written report, the commission

stated, "our investigation persuaded us that these issues [parochialism and duplication] are

largely a result of insufficient focus on the real problem of the department [of Defense] --

effective joint operations.[4]

General John J. Sheehan, commander in chief, US Atlantic Command, dubbed the next

level "beyond joint."[5] General Sheehan described the development of joint operations in three

phases. Phase one is "specialized joint warfare" as characterized by Operation Desert Storm. Joint operations in this phase were "multi-service, multi-dimensional, multi-functional, and driven by common operational objectives." The second phase of the evolutionary process is "synergistic joint operations." These operations use "common doctrine, are mutually supporting, and orchestrated for common tactical objectives." Joint Operations conducted after Desert Storm, particularly Uphold Democracy (Haiti) and Joint Endeavor (Bosnia), approaches the level of phase two. These two stages represent the mechanical integration of forces and doctrine.

Phase three joint operations are "coherent joint operations" and features "common tactical and operational objectives, linked with natural rhythms and cycles." General Sheehan contends that in order to achieve Joint Vision 2010 we must be able to conduct coherent joint operations.[6] An inherent step required to achieve this "natural rhythm" is to expand our joint culture.

The pressing need to expand "jointness" is the foundation for this strategic research paper. One critical issue facing senior military leaders preparing for the 21st Century is, "How to develop a synchronized and coherent joint culture within our Armed Forces?" The need for developing a coherent joint military culture is vital for each service to collectively meet the demands of Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010).

The purpose of this strategic research paper is to provide a conceptual framework for changing the culture of the Armed Forces. This paper analyzes four major areas. First, it examines the nature of organizational culture. Second, it identifies the notion of culture as it applies to the Armed Forces. Third, it identifies the cultural imperatives of JV 2010 and applies some tools from Edgar Schein's models for influencing organizational culture changes. Lastly, it provides recommendations for developing a joint culture in the United States Armed Forces of the future.

ASSUMPTIONS

The subject of organizational culture and change is complex. Framing the discussion of joint service culture requires four basic assumptions:

1) When employed, U.S. operational forces from different branches of the service come together forming a Joint Task Force (JTF) for solving crises.

2) Future defense spending will continue to shrink as a percentage of the overall federal budget. Congress and the president will continue to squeeze as many dollars as possible from the Department of Defense to counterbalance growing domestic and non discretionary spending shortfalls. The pressure to balance the budget as an economic imperative of both political parties will remain constant.

3) Shrinking Department of Defense dollars discourages redundant or overlapping military capabilities among the Services.

4) The four branches of the Armed Forces (Army-Navy-Air Force-Marines) will continue to exist as separate entities. Each service will train and maintain unique capabilities for solving military conflict, and supporting the National Security Strategy.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Organizational culture refers to the ideas, values, actions, and beliefs that are both visible and nonvisible that determine how activities get done, what activities get done, and what activities do not get done in an organization.[7]

Edgar H. Schein, a recognized expert in the field of organizational culture, contends that organizational culture is hard to define, and even harder to measure and analyze. As difficult as it may be to understand organizational culture, it is essential to know how an organization operates on a daily basis, how sub-cultures flourish, and how leadership is "intertwined with it."[8] Schein claims leadership and culture are two different sides of the same coin. "If leaders do not become conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them."[9] Senior leaders must understand the prevailing cultures in the Armed Forces to effectively initiate the changes required to implement JV 2010.

Schein's formal definition of organizational culture is

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved problems of external adaptations and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.[10]

By definition, culture is a powerful force in organizational behavior, development and transformation. Experts in Organizational Development (OD) cite culture as one of the high priority targets for effecting real change in OD programs.[11] "Change becomes permanent when the culture changes and the new ways are accepted as the right ways. When culture promotes collaboration, empowerment, and continuous learning, the organization is bound to succeed."[12]

Changing the culture of an organization is often the most troublesome and difficult problem associated with leadership. A. Elise Walton, an expert in change management, globalization, organizational design and strategy stated,

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Change often begins with a focus on strategy, structure, work process, roles and accountabilities. Yet these 'hardware' changes create only partial change. Full and complete change means changing ... the 'software'... the values, culture, climate, informal operating style, rituals, communication patterns, and so on.[13]

Walton stated it is easier to change the hardware stuff than the software stuff.[14] A quick review of the present "hardware" components associated with changing the Armed Forces culture, as defined by Walton, supports her claims about the easy adjustments. JV 2010 is the operationally based template for the future evolution of the Armed Forces, conceived by the CJCS.[15] Each service followed suit with supporting strategies. The Navy justifies its strategy "Forward from the Sea" as supporting the CJCS's JV 2010. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald R. Fogleman, and Secretary of the Air Force, Ms. Sheila E. Widnall presented the Air Force strategic vision--Global Engagement as "charting a path into the next century as a USAF team and as a joint team within JV 2010."[16] The Army's future template not only claims to support JV 2010, but is similarly named "Army Vision 2010." (AV 2010)[17] In addition to the strategy changes associated with JV 2010, the military structurally reduced in size by approximately 40%. The work process, roles of the Services, and accountabilities matured under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act without serious complications.[18] The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the U.S. military draw down permitted Walton-hardware changes to occur which support implementation of JV 2010.

Schein (and Walton) identified three sources of culture in an organization.[19] According to Walton, leaders must focus on three "software" components in order to change their organization. These components are: 1) patterns of behavior; the visible indicator of culture, 2) beliefs; the "if-then" reasons people use to craft and interpret behavior, 3) values; the non-visible, intensely held and deeply embedded concepts about the way the world works.[20]

Each of the elements of culture is not a stand-alone component, but are interrelated. Walton refers to this relationship as being reflexive. "Beliefs are shaped by behaviors, but behaviors are also shaped by beliefs. Values impact on behavior and beliefs, but behaviors and beliefs also affect values."[21] This "reflexive" trait makes it possible for leaders to shape the culture by direct actions, indirect actions, and through personal charisma.[22] Schein further details six mechanisms for embedding culture (direct actions) and six mechanisms for reinforcing culture (indirect actions). At appendix A and B are a list and brief discussion of each mechanism.

CULTURAL IDENTITIES

The final benefit of Joint Vision 2010 is that it will allow us to achieve higher levels of jointness. We will always fight jointly, and despite tremendous progress over the last several years we must continuously refine our war fighting capabilities.[23]

Achieving higher levels of "jointness" requires us to determine two things. First, we must understand where we are in the present. Second, we must acknowledge what is stopping us from progressing beyond this point. First consideration's first, where are we?

SERVICE CULTURES

Each branch of the service has its own unique culture. Writing about service cultures is extremely ticklish. Carl Builder, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, and author of The Masks of War said, "Characterizing institutions can be amusing (or painful). Giving institutions a personality is a way of giving them a face that can be remembered, recalled, and applied in evaluating future behavior or circumstances."[24] Attempts to condense service culture to few paragraphs is always dangerous, but nonetheless obligatory to frame the question "where are we?"

The Army's culture is one that takes its "greatest pride in their [individual] skill as opposed to their possessions."[25] "Traditionally the American Army considered itself the neutral instrument of state power. It exists to carry out the government's orders, and when ordered it does not ask 'Why?' or 'What for?'"[26] In the realm of jointness, "the army is quick to point out that no form of equipment is more sophisticated than simple, all-weather, all terrain soldiers, who-the Army war games show-are the answer to the search for the elusive 'reconnaissance-strike-complex'"[27] The Army possesses the unique capability to conduct "prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the entire spectrum of crisis, and to ... [operate] as part of the joint war fighting team envisioned in JV 2010."[28]

Selfless service, and acknowledging that the Army is part of the Joint Team are hallmarks of Army operational doctrine. Army leaders have always appreciated the synergy resulting from combined arms operations.[29] Doctrine for success on the battlefield required cooperation between all Army branches. It is only a short reach in the minds of most soldiers that coupling operations with Navy, Air Force and Marine "cousins" would increase the probability of success.

The Navy's cultural identity is independence and stature. "It is about wielding sea power as the most important and flexible kind of military power for America as a maritime nation. The means to those ends are the institution and its traditions, which provides permanence beyond the people who serve them."[30] General David C. Jones, a former CJCS, captured the autonomous mode in which the Navy comfortably operates.

> The Department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the Services-it has its own army, navy, and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all assets, and be left alone.[31]

The Navy strongly advocates that the physical presence of carrier battle groups far outweighs any notions of "virtual global presence." The navy also asserts that Presidents historically select the

maritime services as the "force of choice" for intervention. This choice becomes more applicable "as most of the world's population is concentrated within a few hundred miles of the littoral [sea coast] regions"[32]

"The Air Force sees itself as the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by technology. The bond is not an institution, but the love of flying machines and flight."[33] "The Air Force is the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war-the technological marvels of flight that have been adapted for war."[34] The Air Force is advancing theories of air power and space power in terms of it's Global Engagement Strategy. "The Air Force can talk of the 'enemy as a system' or of 'striking plural strategic centers of gravity,' but few people in [or outside] the Air Force know what those phrases mean."[35] The techno-speak of the Air Force strategy is symbolic of the branch's identity.

The United States Marine Corps, a subset of the U.S. Navy, has its own unique culture and a shared culture with the U.S. Navy. Marines pride themselves on adapting to the mission and being able to operate in all three mediums (air-land-sea). Their motto "Semper Fi" embodies the essence of the Corps. Additionally, "the Corps" appears to have the invisible hand of Congress guarding it.

> The USMC enjoys a reputation with Congress for its competency within a well defined, if limited, role and for its relatively modest claims for resources. The Marines are almost bystanders in the continuous jostling and bumping of the Army, Navy and Air Force over military strategy and resources. They appear protected from harm by Congress and quite comfortable with hand-me-down equipment developed by other Services, taking more pride in who they are than in what they own.[36]

CULTURAL IMPEDIMENTS

Determining Service personality is just the first step in peeling the "cultural onion." The next steps are to identify the pressure points that prevent the Services from fully cooperating.

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Three main pressure points affecting service cooperation are budgets, strategies, and representation on the joint staff.

A major point of service contention is how they compete for funding. Cooperative efforts splinter the Services as they vie for scarce resources within a common planning, programming, and budgeting system. Shrinking defense budgets provoke this competition.

> A Pentagon admiral, speaking under the promise of non-attribution, observed that such fighting has already begun, acknowledging, "It used to be a race to the finish line. Now it's more like a demolition derby: to get your program across the finish line, you have to convince others [the JROC] to kill another service's program."[37]

Linked to cooperation conflicts are the individual service strategies for meeting the requirements of our national security strategy and the supporting national military strategy. "Grand strategy, military strategy, technological implications, and future budgetary uncertainties guarantee a sharp rivalry of ideas."[38] Service chiefs are keenly aware that each idea advanced by another service has future force structure implications for the strategy that loses.

> Major military strategy alternatives are the inevitable support for the preferred force structure, and will not favor services equally. They will be heatedly debated, and such debate will be made more contentious by the growing emphasis on truly new technologies, the implications of a system of systems.[39]

Theater ballistic missile defense (TMD) is one example of this type of interservice competition. Air Force success with its Airborne Laser (ABL) technology directly threatens the Army's force structure for Patriot Air Defense units in the field, and its future Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) battalions designed to counter enemy surface to surface missiles.

Service representation on the joint staff is another major concern. "The GNA created a Joint Service Officer (JSO) career track to improve the quality of and performance of officers assigned to joint duty."[40] The issue facing the Services is: Are the best and brightest officers assigned to Joint billets? While the Navy and Air Forces seem to reward officers who serve in

joint assignments, one service (the Army) seems out of synch. LTC William J. Troy, U.S. Army, expressed concern about his branch of service. Troy noted that of 13 JWCA teams, only one Army General Officer and two Colonels currently hold key positions. Compared to the sister Services the Army is severely under represented.[41] U.S. Army PERSCOM representatives noted that Army promotions for JSO officers in the field grade ranks (Major through Colonel) were consistently below their "pure green" brothers. Additionally, the last General Officer promotion board demonstrated that JSO qualifications were not important criteria for selection (less than 1/3 had served a full 36 month tour on the Joint Staff).[42] Has the Army reduced the importance of joint duty as a criterion for promotion? If so, it signals a cultural swing away from jointness.

Each cultural impediment drives a wedge in the jointness effort. The GNA forces the CJCS, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to seek solutions for improving jointness. One possible solution is for the JCS to improve the joint culture of the Armed Forces. In order to develop a joint culture it is important to identify the basic requirements to implement JV 2010.

CULTURAL IMPERATIVES FOR JOINT VISION 2010

"Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting."[43] JV 2010 stresses six critical elements that transform the vision's operational concepts (dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics) into coherent joint capabilities in the 21st Century.[44] Additionally, the imperative for jointness requires the forces to have "seamless integration institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically."[45] This section discusses each imperative, and applies principles from Schein's model that leaders can use to sustain or change culture.

QUALITY PEOPLE

Senior leaders presently do a good job expressing the value of jointness. However, work remains on synchronizing the criteria for rewards, status, and promotions. We know from Schein (and others) that actual practices carry the most weight in this regard.[46] The reward and incentive program for all members of the Armed forces serving in joint billets must be commensurate with their non-joint peers. The SecDef, CJCS, and Service Secretaries can greatly influence the "esteem factor" associated with JSO qualification by closely monitoring the promotion selection rates, especially to the most senior grades.

In addition to rewards, service chiefs and secretaries have the wherewithal to use "coercive persuasion" with the personnel management system. Friction naturally occurs as the Services balance their own headquarters' staffing demands for quality officers with joint requirements. However, as we move into the 21st Century, we must expose the best and brightest junior officers (Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) to the realities of the strategic and political environments. The price Services pay today to give quality officers grass root joint experience, has a high payoff five to ten years hence.

INNOVATIVE LEADERSHIP

According to JV 2010, innovative leadership requires focus on three areas: building a foundation of functional expertise, core values, and high ethical standards; developing strong leadership skills; and encouraging versatility in complex joint and multinational operations.[47]

In order to change the culture there is a continuing need "... for top executives to rally the troops personally and charismatically. If top management dominates the air waves, they silence others."[48] Senior leaders can directly impact leadership by deliberate role modeling, teaching,

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and coaching. Presently, the CJCS and Service Chiefs do a good job providing organizational philosophies and creeds (reinforcement mechanisms like JV 2010 and AV 2010).

Other reinforcement mechanisms affecting organizational design, structure, and procedures for joint professional military education (JPME) enable the Armed Forces to grow leaders with a breadth of jointness. COL David E. Price, Air Force Chief of Staff Chairholder at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces made five important recommendations for improving leadership in the 21st Century. His key proposal was for the Joint Chiefs to adopt a comprehensive development concept to guide the efforts for educating officers. This education process needs to focus on "joint experience, cross cultural and linguistic skills, an understanding of information age warfare, and a business executive's eye for cost and quality."[49]

Another aspect of cultural change with respect to leadership is time. Experts estimate that it takes either 5-10 years[50] to completely change an organization's culture, or 3-7 years with a good plan, and continuity of effort.[51] Senior military leaders hold their jobs for only 2-4 years. The CJCS and Service Chiefs must insure their plans endure beyond their tenure in those key positions.

JOINT DOCTRINE

"Doctrine establishes the foundation of our ability to fight as a joint team."[52] Doctrine is also the focus for systems, applications, and technology in the Armed Forces.[53] Doctrine development reinforces what is important to leaders, and "formalize" (from Schein) what leaders check. Doctrine directly influences the culture of the Armed Forces because it "fundamentally shapes the way we plan, think, and train for military operations."[54]

Linked to doctrine is the acquisition process (JROC and JWCA) which directly affects the Services war fighting capabilities and organization. Organizational structure is a potent tool

for changing culture.[55] The direction that doctrine orients a branch of services has powerful short and long term affects on the organization.

JOINT EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Former CJCS, GEN Colin L. Powell succinctly stated, "We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a team."[56] These words remain the guideposts for jointness. The idea of joint education and training is already embedded in culture of the Services. Operational commanders are challenging existing cultural icons. During a recent Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) seminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas a serving Army Corps Commander told the BCTP staff "they had to go joint or lose their relevancy."[57] Expanding joint training, not limiting opportunities must continue to be the norm.

Numerous issues abound on the question of when JPME should begin for officers. In a continuous round of "e-mail chatter" (under the title of Radical Purple, initiated by LTC Doug Gilbert of the Center for Army Leadership) numerous contributors discussed two common themes. The first concerns the conflict between service competency and joint competency requirements. The second concerned the timing and level at which "service schools" focused away from parochial issues and turned "purple."

Individual Services must prepare leaders and warriors for the environment described by JV 2010 early in their careers without sacrificing their basic Service competencies. This preparation includes formal training, education, and hands on experience in tough demanding exercises with sister Services, coalition forces, and includes government and non government agencies. As the Armed Forces move to more joint operations, the logical time to begin serious joint training is during the MEL 4 (Command and General Staff College) phase of the Officer Education System.

Complementing this training is the opportunity for progressive assignment in positions requiring innovation, dealing with ambiguity, and an intuitive grasp of military art. [58]

AGILE ORGANIZATIONS

Executing JV 2010 requires organizations to confront two cultural issues. First, military units must exploit emerging technology, respond to diverse threats, and demonstrate the ability to operate outside traditional organizational structures. Second, organizations must operate with "less start up time between deployment and employment." [59]

New technologies, especially those concerning information, provide the primary means for making organizations more responsive. According to Schein, new technologies create foundations for instituting new cultures. [60] LTC Douglas Macgregor's book, "Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century," details the advantages of linking Information Age technology to reducing military structure. Macgregor's conclusion is that industrial age military organizations have outlived their usefulness and must become flatter. Changing organizational structure also requires "a radical revision of current programs for educating and training leaders." [61]

ENHANCED MATERIAL

The critical factor throughout JV 2010 is the ability to leverage leading edge technology and place greater emphasis on common usage between the Services. [62] The Services must develop a culture that eliminates redundancy, yet optimizes interoperability and economy.

Changing how Services' acquire modernized equipment, while protecting interoperability and economy, requires "an engine on the joint level to drive the formulation of military doctrine [in coordination with the JROC] in support of the national military strategy." [63] The most fundamental way to reshape the air, ground and maritime forces is to capitalize on each services Doctrine Command's geographical proximity, and link the three Services with the Joint Warfighting Center. [64]

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING A JOINT CULTURE

Effective organizational change mandates all changes be clearly connected to an organization's culture. Making this connection not only enables effective implementation, but also embeds change into the daily life of an organization.[65]

This section outlines specific recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon Schein's tools for embedding and reinforcing culture. The ultimate goal is for the JCS to develop the coherent joint Service culture described by General Sheehan, and required to fully implement JV 2010.

The principle means for changing Service culture is by modifying organizational infrastructure. The first recommendation concerns improving the process of vying for resources. The JCS should create a Joint Doctrine Command [JDC]. A JDC, linked to the JROC and JWCA process, nullifies the contentious and dividing forces of resource competition. The JDC also negates the adverse effects of competing Service strategies. Why? Because the joint staff is the only military body that addresses integration and conflict resolution from a total organizational perspective.[66]

Doctrine, besides impacting resources and strategies, drives how the Services will organize to fight in the future. The JDC ultimately influences the acquisition of new weapons and systems that form the building blocks for organizations. The JDC can be a hammer to smash old organizational paradigms, and make way for smaller, agile, flatter organizations in the future.[67]

Rules and policies of the Services must change to reinforce the need for field grade officers to serve in joint assignments. The simplest and most direct approach is to make 24 months of joint duty a precondition for Colonel level command and promotion to Brigadier General.[68] Colonels serving in a joint billet less than 24 months when a selection board meets,

can be screened for command or promotion, but remain ineligible to assume command or promotion until completing 24 months of joint duty. This change encourages the best and brightest field grade officers to seek joint assignments, and penalizes officers who avoid joint duty and seek recognition on Service pure staffs.

My third recommendation is to grant JPME phase II certification to all Senior Service Colleges (SSC). Officers, not previously JPME phase II certified, selected to attend SSC could take a "Joint Track" designed to provide them the background and skills needed in joint assignments. JPME phase II qualified students can serve as peer trainers to enrich seminar discussions. SSCs should also maintain enrollment ratios among sister Services, International Fellows, and civilian students at the current USAWC rate (5 of 16 per seminar). This mixture ensures the Officer Corps stays "purple" as it addresses strategic issues in the SSC environment.

In addition to the infrastructure changes, I recommend the JCS take direct actions to develop innovative leaders. The JCS must demand all senior leaders mentor, coach and teach subordinates to be critical thinkers. The JCS must also continue to lead using common (joint) core values as a theme. "Values give an organization a self ordering quality, a ballast, which provides direction and stability in periods of turmoil, stress, and change."[69] Each service now espouses slightly different "core values." While they are worded differently, common threads exist in all the Services' values. It is critical that the Service Chiefs speak with one voice in interpreting these values. A giant step toward a coherent joint culture would be developing "Joint Core Values." Additionally, the JCS must consistently demonstrate trust in each other, trust in their sister Services, and communicate that message clearly throughout their entire organization.

Members of the JCS should liberally use lessons of history, citing past and present contributors to the legacy of innovation and cooperation in joint operations. Historical vignettes have powerful effects on culture. Leaders should also take special care to ensure the reward's system properly and publicly acknowledge excellence in joint operations.

A final recommendation is to study the cultural dimensions of information age technology. This topic is worth of separate strategic research paper. JV 2010 liberally addresses using information age technology without regard for any possible underlying cultural challenges.

Developing a coherent joint military culture requires hard work and the constant attention of senior leadership. Although changing culture is often described as extremely difficult, there are many simple methods and techniques described in this research paper, and in the sources I used, to assist leaders with this task. The thread of logic woven throughout this paper is that the Armed Forces can not achieve a coherent joint culture by welding pieces together and calling it joint. We must cooperate and work together from the earliest stages of education, training, organizing, and resourcing our forces. The foundation for all that we do is in Joint Doctrine. A future Joint Doctrine Command is the critical engine that can meld, rather than weld, the pieces of the Services together. The Joint Doctrine Command, linked with direct actions by senior leaders, is truly the cornerstone to developing the "Coherent Joint Culture" necessary to implement JV 2010.

APPENDIX A: <u>PRIMARY EMBEDDING MECHANISMS</u> [70]

Leaders embed culture consciously or unconsciously in their organizations.[71] The primary embedding mechanisms provide senior leaders with the greatest leverage to change the culture of their organization.

1. What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis. Leaders who consistently check on the same things, have a systematic method of dealing with issues, and match their actions with their words have a significant impact on the organization's culture. Leaders who are inconsistent or send mixed signals cause subordinates to spend excess energy trying to interpret what the leader believes is important. Subordinates may reach erroneous conclusions about what the leader really means or wants.

2. How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises. Culture and crisis are inversely proportional. Leaders who effectively reduce organizational anxiety increase their ability to influence the culture. Crisis is always a relative term, and includes real and perceived events.

3. Observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources. This process tells the organization what the leader truly believes is important. Programs that survive budget cuts and adjustments send powerful messages throughout the organization.

4. Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching. The visible behavior of a leader communicates assumptions and values rapidly to other members of the organization. This behavior is especially noticeable to new members of an organization. Leaders must consistently walk the organizational walk, and talk the organizational talk. Leaders reinforce cultures to greater degrees in informal setting than in formal settings.

5. Observed criterion for allocating rewards and status. Leaders quickly get across their own priorities, values, and assumptions by constantly linking rewards and punishments to desired behaviors. The actual practice, not the formally espoused, published, or preached policy has the greatest impact. "Employees pay attention to values-in-use more than to espoused values."[72]

6. Observed criterion for recruiting, hiring, promoting, retirement, and excommunication of organizational members. These practices represent the most potent means for embedding or changing the organization's culture. A leader directly influences the organization's culture by the manner in which he controls promotions or brings in new members. He can choose to hire a different "strain" of worker, or he can seek to perpetuate the current culture. Leadership's choices for promotion also send strong signals throughout the organization. This method is sometimes the most subtle way leaders affect their organization. Great secrecy shrouds the selection process for the most senior leaders in large organizations. In the Armed Forces, a relatively small number of key military and civilian leaders control the selection process for the most senior military leadership positions.

APPENDIX B: <u>SECONDARY ARTICULATION & REINFORCEMENT MECHANISMS</u> [73]

The secondary mechanisms, unless consistent with primary mechanisms, can inhibit or constrain senior leader attempts to make changes.[74]

1. Organizational design and structure. Leaders can exert considerable influence in the area of organizational design and structure. Reassignment of roles and responsibilities unleashes raw power struggles and creates formidable disturbances in an organization. Senior leaders normally minimize their actions in this domain unless absolutely necessary.[75]

2. Organizational systems and procedures. "Systems and procedures can formalize the process of 'paying attention' and thus reinforce the message that leaders really care about certain things."[76]

3. Organizational rites and rituals. Rites and rituals are the form or manner governing the words or actions of the organization. Rites and rituals serve as "cultural reminders" which leaders can harness to eternalize the desired behaviors.[77]

4. Design of physical space, facades, and buildings. Encompass the visible features of an organization that visitors, clients, customers, or new employees immediately recognize. Leaders with a clear philosophy and style often tend to embody that style with visible manifestations.

5. Stories, legends, myths, about people and events. The legacy of the founders, heroes, and the lore associated with significant events in the life of an organization profoundly affects culture.[78]

6. Formal statements about organizational philosophy, values, and creed. The official statements of an organization are helpful to external groups attempting to understand the organization. Inside organizations, formal statements have merit for members only when action reinforces the words.

END NOTES

[1] GEN John M. Shalikashvili, "A Word From the Chairman," <u>Joint Forces Quarterly</u>, Autumn 1996, Number 13, p.6.

[2] Ibid.

[3] GEN John M. Shalikashvili, "A Word From the Chairman," <u>Joint Forces Quarterly</u>, Summer 1996, Number 12, p.4.

[4] Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, <u>Directions for Defense</u>, Washington DC, 24 May 1995, p.1-4.

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